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1. Macroeconomic Motivation 
Questions related to the determination of prices for oil and other mineral and agricultural 
commodities have always fallen predominantly in the province of microeconomics. 
Nevertheless, there are times when so many commodity prices are moving so far in the same 
direction that it becomes difficult to ignore the influence of macroeconomic phenomena. The 
decade of the 1970s was one such time; recent history provides another. A rise in the price of oil 
might be explained by “peak oil” fears, a risk premium related to instability in the Persian Gulf, 
or political developments in Russia, Nigeria or Venezuela. Spikes in certain agricultural prices 
might be explained by drought in Australia, shortages in China, or ethanol subsidies in the 
United States. But it cannot be a coincidence that almost all commodity prices rose together 
during much of the past decade, and peaked so abruptly and jointly in mid-2008. Indeed, from 
2003-2008, three theories (at least) competed to explain the widespread ascent of commodity 
prices. 
First, and perhaps most standard, was the global demand growth explanation. This 
argument stems from the unusually widespread growth in economic activity – particularly 
including the arrival of China, India and other entrants to the list of important economies – 
together with the prospects of continued high growth in those countries in the future. This growth 
has raised the demand for, and hence the price of, commodities. While reasonable, the size of 
this effect is uncertain. 
The second explanation, also highly popular, at least outside of academia, was 
destabilising speculation. Many commodities are highly storable; a large number are actively 
traded on futures markets. We can define speculation as the purchases of the commodities —
whether in physical form or via contracts traded on an exchange – in anticipation of financial   2
                                                          
gain at the time of resale. There is no question that speculation, so defined, is a major force in the 
market. However, the second explanation is more specific: that speculation was a major force 
that pushed commodity prices up during 2003-2008. In the absence of a fundamental reason to 
expect higher prices, this would be an instance of destabilising speculation or of a speculative 
bubble. But the role of speculators need not be pernicious; perhaps speculation was stabilising 
during this period. If speculators were short on average (in anticipation of a future reversion to 
more normal levels), they would have kept prices lower than they otherwise would be. 
Much evidence has been brought to bear on this argument. To check if speculators 
contributed to the price rises, one can examine whether futures prices lay above or below spot 
prices, and whether their net open positions were positive or negative.
1 A particularly convincing 
point against the destabilising speculation hypothesis is that commodities without any futures 
markets have experienced approximately as much volatility as commodities with active 
derivative markets. We also note that efforts to ban speculative futures markets have usually 
failed to reduce volatility in the past. Another relevant issue is the behaviour of inventories, 
which seems to undermine further the hypothesis that speculators contributed to the 2003-08 run-
up in prices. The premise is that inventories were not historically high, and in some cases were 
historically low. Thus speculators could not plausibly have been betting on price increases and 
could not, therefore, have added to the current demand.
2 One can also ask whether speculators 
seem to exhibit destabilising “bandwagon expectations.” That is, do speculators seem to act on 
 
1 Expectations of future oil prices on the part of typical speculators, if anything, initially lagged behind 
contemporaneous spot prices. Furthermore, speculators have often been “net short” (sellers) of commodities rather 
than “long” (buyers). In other words they may have delayed or moderated the price increases, rather than initiating 
or adding to them.  
2 See Krugman (2008a, b) and Wolf (2008).   3
, but 
                                                          
the basis of forecasts of future commodity prices that extrapolate recent trends? The case for 
destabilising speculative effects on commodity prices remains an open one. 
The third explanation, somewhat less prominent than the first two, is that easy monetary 
policy was at least one of the factors contributing to either the high demand for, or low supply of, 
commodities. Easy monetary policy is often mediated through low real interest rates.
3 Some 
have argued that high prices for oil and other commodities in the 1970s were not exogenous
rather a result of easy monetary policy.
4 Conversely, a substantial increase in real interest rates 
drove commodity prices down in the early 1980s, especially in the United States. High real 
interest rates raise the cost of holding inventories; lower demand for inventories then contributes 
to lower total demand for oil and other commodities. A second effect of higher interest rates is 
that they undermine the incentive for oil-producing countries to keep crude under the ground. By 
pumping oil instead of preserving it, OPEC countries could invest the proceeds at interest rates 
that were higher than the return to leaving it in the ground. Higher rates of pumping increase 
supply; both lower demand and higher supply contribute to a fall in oil prices. After 2000, the 
process went into reverse. The Federal Reserve cut real interest rates sharply in 2001-2004, and 
again in 2008. Each time, it lowered the cost of holding inventories, thereby contributing to an 
increase in demand and a decline in supply. 
Critics of the interest rate theory as an explanation of the boom that peaked in 2008 point 
out that it implies that inventory levels should have been high, but argue that they were not. This 
is the same point that has been raised in objection to the destabilising speculation theory. For that 
matter, it can be applied to most theories. Explanation number one, the global boom theory, is 
 
3 See Frankel (2008a, b), for example. A variant of the argument blaming the 2008 spike on easy monetary policy is 
that the mediating variable is expected inflation per se, rather than the real interest rate: Calvo (2008). 
4 For example, Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004).   4
often phrased in terms of expectations of China’s future growth path, not just its currently-high 
level of income; but this factor, too, if operating in the market place, should in theory work to 
raise demand for inventories.
5 
How might high demand for commodities be reconciled with low observed inventories? 
One possibility is that researchers are looking at the wrong inventory data. Standard data 
inevitably exclude various components of inventories, such as those held by users or those in 
faraway countries. They typically exclude deposits, crops, forests, or herds that lie in or on the 
ground. In other words, what is measured in inventory data is small compared to reserves. The 
decision by producers to pump oil today or to leave it underground for the future is more 
important than the decisions of oil companies or downstream users to hold higher or lower 
inventories. And the lower real interest rates of 2001-2005 and 2008 clearly reduced the 
incentive for oil producers to pump oil, relative to what it would otherwise have been.
6 We 
classify low extraction rates as low supply and high inventories as high demand; but either way 
the result is upward pressure on prices. 
In 2008, enthusiasm for explanations number two and three, the speculation and interest 
rate theories, increased, at the expense of explanation number one, the global boom. Previously, 
rising demand from the global expansion, especially the boom in China, had seemed the obvious 
explanation for rising commodity prices. But the sub-prime mortgage crisis hit the United States 
around August 2007. Virtually every month thereafter, forecasts of growth were downgraded, 
not just for the United States but for the rest of the world as well, including China.
7 Meanwhile 
                                                           
5 We are indebted to Larry Summers for this point. 
6 The King of Saudi Arabia said at this time that his country might as well leave the reserves in the ground for its 
grandchildren (Reuters, 13 April 2008).  
7 For example, World Economic Outlook, International Monetary Fund, October 2007, April 2008 and October 
2008. Also OECD and World Bank (years?_). 
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commodity prices, far from declining as one might expect from the global demand hypothesis, 
climbed at an accelerated rate. For the year following August 2007, at least, the global boom 
theory was clearly irrelevant. That left explanations number two and three.  
In both cases – increased demand arising from either low interest rates or expectations of 
capital gains – detractors pointed out that the explanations implied that inventory holdings 
should be high and continued to argue that this was not the case.
8 To repeat a counterargument, 
especially in the case of oil, what is measured in inventory data is small compared to reserves 
under the ground.  
The paper presents a theoretical model of the determination of prices for storable commodities 
that gives full expression to such macroeconomic factors as economic activity and real interest 
rates. However, we do not ignore other fundamentals relevant for commodity price 
determination. To the contrary, our model includes a number of microeconomic factors including 
(but not limited to) inventories. We then estimate the equation using both macroeconomic and 
commodity-specific microeconomic determinants of commodity prices.    To preview the results, 
most of the hypothesized determinants of real commodity prices receive support, when the data 
are aggregated across commodities:    inventories, uncertainty, speculation, economic growth and 
expected inflation.   The main disappointment is that the real interest rate does not appear to have 
a significant effect. 
 
2. A Theory of Commodity Price Determination 
Most agricultural and mineral products differ from other goods and services in that they 
are both storable and relatively homogeneous. As a result, they are hybrids of assets – where 
price is determined by supply of and demand for stocks – and goods, for which the  flows of 
supply and demand matter.
9 
                                                           
8 See among others, Krugman(2008), and Kohn( 2008). 
9 For example, Frankel (1984) and Calvo (2008). 
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 [JF] The elements of an appropriate model have long been known.
10 The monetary aspect of 
the theory can be reduced to its simplest algebraic essence as a relationship between the real 
interest rate and the spot price of a commodity relative to its expected long-run equilibrium price. 
This relationship can be derived from two simple assumptions. The first governs expectations. 
Let: 
s ≡ the natural logarithm of the spot price, 
s ≡ its long run equilibrium,  
p ≡ the (log of the) economy-wide price index,  
q ≡ s-p, the (log) real price of the commodity, and 
q ≡ the long run (log) equilibrium real price of the commodity. 
Market participants who observe the real price of the commodity today lying either above or 
below its perceived long-run value, expect it to regress back to equilibrium in the future over 
time, at an annual rate that is proportionate to the gap: 
 
E [ Δ (s – p ) ] ≡ E[ Δq] = - θ (q-q)           ( 1 )  
 
or  E (Δs) = - θ (q-q) + E(Δp) .          ( 2 )  
 
Following the classic Dornbusch (1976) overshooting paper, which developed the model for the 
case of exchange rates, we begin by simply asserting the reasonableness of the form of 
expectations in these equations. It seems reasonable to expect a tendency for prices to regress 
                                                           
10 See Frankel (1986, 2008), among others. 
  6back toward long run equilibrium. But, as in that paper, it can be shown that regressive 
expectations are also rational expectations, under certain assumptions regarding the stickiness of 
prices of other goods (manufactures and services) and a certain restriction on the parameter value 
θ.
11 
One alternative that we consider below is that expectations also have an extrapolative 
component to them. We model this as: 
E (Δs) = - θ (q-q) + E(Δp) + δ (Δs -1 ).       (2’) 
The next equation concerns the decision whether to hold the commodity for another 
period – leaving it in the ground, on the trees, or in inventory – or to sell it at today’s price and 
use the proceeds to earn interest, an equation familiar from Hotelling’s celebrated logic. The 
expected rate of return to these two alternatives must be the same: 
E (Δs) + c = i,    where: c ≡ cy – sc – rp;       ( 3 )  
cy ≡ convenience yield from holding the stock (for example, the insurance value of having an 
assured supply of some critical input in the event of a disruption, or in the case of a commodity 
like gold, the psychic pleasure of holding it); 
sc ≡ storage costs (for example, feed lot rates for cattle, silo rents and spoilage rates for grains,  
rental rates on oil tanks or oil tankers, costs of security to prevent plundering by others, etc);
12  
rp ≡ E(Δs) – (f-s) ≡ risk premium, where f is the log of the forward/futures rate at the same 
maturity as the interest rate. The risk premium is positive if being long in commodities is risky; 
and 
                                                           
11 Frankel (1986). 
12 Fama and French (1987) and Bopp and Lady (1991) emphasise storage costs. 
  7i ≡ the nominal interest rate.
13 
  There is no reason why the convenience yield, storage costs or the risk premium should 
be constant over time. If one is interested in the derivatives markets, one often focuses on the 
forward discount or slope of the futures curve, f-s in log terms (also sometimes called the 
“spread” or the “roll”). For example, the null hypothesis that the forward spread is an unbiased 
forecast of the future change in the spot price has been tested extensively.
14 This issue does not 
affect the questions addressed in this paper, however. Here we note only that one need not 
interpret the finding of bias in the futures rate as a rejection of rational expectations; it could be 
due to a risk premium. From Equation (3), the spread is given by: 
f-s = i-cy+sc, or equivalently f-s = E( Δs) – rp.          ( 4 )  
On average f-s tends to be negative. This phenomenon, ‘normal backwardation’, suggests that 
convenience yield on average outweighs the interest rate and storage costs.
15 To get our main 
result, we simply combine Equations (2) and (3): 
 
 - θ (q-q) + E(Δp) + c = i => q-q
                                                          
 = - (1/θ) (i - E(Δp) – c) .     (5) 
Equation (5) says that the real price of the commodity, measured relative to its long-run 
equilibrium, is inversely proportional to the real interest rate (measured relative to the term c, 
which could be described as the net convenience yield – that is, the convenience yield after 
 
13 Working (1949) and Breeden (1980) are classic references on the roles of carrying costs and the risk premium, 
respectively, in commodity markets. Yang, Bessler and Leatham (2001) review the literature.  
14 As in the (even more extensive) tests of the analogous unbiasedness propositions in the contexts of forward 
foreign exchange markets and the term structure of interest rates, the null hypothesis is usually rejected. The 
Appendix to this paper briefly reviews this literature.  
15 For example, Kolb (1992).  
  8accounting for storage costs and any risk premium). When the real interest rate is high, as in the 
1980s, money will flow out of commodities. This will continue until the prices of commodities 
are perceived to lie sufficiently below their future equilibria, generating expectations of future 
price increases, at which point the quasi-arbitrage condition will be met. Conversely, when the 
real interest rate is low, as in 2001-05 and 2008-09, money will flow into commodities. (This is 
the same phenomenon that also sends money flowing to foreign currencies (the ‘carry trade’), 
emerging markets, and other securities.) This will continue until the prices of commodities (or 
the other alternative assets) are perceived to lie sufficiently above their future equilibria, 
generating expectations of future price decreases, so as to satisfy the speculative condition. 
Under the alternative specification that leaves a possible role for bandwagon effects, we 
combine Equations (2’) and (3) to get: 
q-q = - (1/θ) (i - E(Δp) – c) + (δ /θ) (Δs -1 ).      ( 5 ’ )  
As noted, there is no reason for the net convenience yield, c, in Equation (5) to be 
constant. Substituting from (3) into (5),  
c ≡ cy – sc – rp => 
q-q = - (1/θ) [i - E(Δp) – cy + sc + rp ]  
q= q - (1/θ) [i-E(Δp)] + (1/θ) cy - (1/θ) sc - (1/θ) rp .       (6) 
 
Thus, even if we continue to take the long-run equilibrium q as given, there are other variables 
in addition to the real interest rate that determine the real price: the convenience yield; storage 
costs; and the risk premium. But the long-run equilibrium real commodity price q need not 
  9  10
                                                          
necessarily be constant. Fluctuations in the convenience yield, storage costs, or the risk premium 
might also contain a permanent component; all such effects would then appear in the equation.  
An additional hypothesis of interest is that storable commodities may serve as a hedge 
against inflation. Under this view, an increase in the expected long-run inflation rate would then 
raise the demand for commodities thereby increasing real commodity prices today.
16 Adding the 
lagged inflation rate as a separate explanatory variable in the equation is thus another possible 
way of getting at the influence of monetary policy on commodity prices.  
One way to isolate monetary effects on commodity prices is to look at jumps in financial 
markets that occur in immediate response to government announcements that change perceptions 
of the macroeconomic situation, as did Federal Reserve money supply announcements in the 
early 1980s. The experiment is interesting because news regarding disruptions to the supply of 
commodities and so forth is unlikely to have come out during the short time intervals in question. 
Frankel and Hardouvelis (1985) used Federal Reserve money supply announcements to test the 
monetary implications of this general theory of commodity price determination. Announcements 
that were interpreted as signalling tighter monetary policy indeed induced statistically significant 
decreases in commodity prices: money announcements that caused interest rates to jump up 
would on average cause commodity prices to fall, and vice versa. As an alternative to the event 
study approach, in this paper we focus on estimating an equation for commodity price 
determination. 
In translating Equation (6) into empirically usable form, there are several measurable 
determinants of the real commodity price for which we need to account. We discuss these in 
turn. 
 
16 This is the view of Calvo (2008). Inventories. Storage costs rise with the extent to which inventory holdings strain existing 
storage capacity: sc = Φ (INVENTORIES). If the level of inventories is observed to be at the high end 
historically, then storage costs must be high (absent any large recent increase in storage 
capacity), which has a negative effect on commodity prices.
17 Substituting into Equation (6), 
  11
 
q= q - (1/θ) [i-E(Δp)] + (1/θ) cy - (1/θ) Φ (INVENTORIES) - (1/θ) rp .    (7) 
 
There is no reason to think that the relationship  ) (o Φ  is necessarily linear. We assume 
linearity in our estimation for simplicity, but allowing for non-linearity is a desirable extension 
of the analysis. Under the logic that inventories are bounded below by zero and above by some 
absolutely peak storage capacity, a logistic function might be appropriate.
18 
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could use: 
 
INVENTORIES = Φ
-1 ( sc )    = Φ
-1 (cy - i – (s-f) )        (8) 
We see that low interest rates should predict not only high commodity prices but also high 
inventory holdings.  
Economic Activity (denoted Y) is a determinant of the convenience yield cy, since it 
drives the transactions demand for inventories. Higher economic activity should have a positive 
                                                           
17 Ye et al (2002, 2005, 2006) emphasise the role of inventories in forecasting oil prices: Notice that, once we 
condition on the real interest rate (and convenience yield), inventories have a negative effect on commodity prices, 
rather than the positive relationship that has appeared in the arguments of Krugman (2008a,b), Kohn (2008) and 
Wolf (2008). [Note to authors: check exactly which year this quote is from and add page number?] 
18 We are implicitly assuming that the long-run commodity price can be modeled by a constant or trend term.   12
effect on the demand for inventory holdings and thus on prices; we usually proxy this with GDP. 
Let us designate the relationship γ (Y). Again, the assumption of linearity is arbitrary. 
Medium-Term Volatility (denoted σ), another determinant of convenience yield, cy, 
should have a positive effect on the demand for inventories and therefore on prices. It may also 
be a determinant of the risk premium. Again, we assume linearity for convenience. 
Risk (political, financial and economic), in the case of oil for example, is measured by a 
weighted average of political risk among 12 top oil producers. (In the measures we use, a rise in 
the index represents a decrease in risk.) The theoretical effect on price is ambiguous. Risk is 
another determinant of cy (especially to the extent that risk concerns fear of disruption of 
availability), whereby it should have a positive effect on inventory demand and therefore on 
commodity prices. But it is also a determinant of the risk premium rp , whereby it should have a 
negative effect on commodity prices. 
The Spot-Futures Spread. Intuitively the futures-spot spread reflects the speculative 
return to holding inventories.
19 It is one component of the risk premium, along with expected 
depreciation. A higher spot-futures spread (normal backwardation), or lower future-spot spread, 
signifies a low speculative return and so should have a negative effect on inventory demand and 
on prices.
20 
Substituting these extra effects into Equation (7), we get 
 
q = C - (1/θ)[i-E(Δp)] + (1/θ)γ(Y) - (1/θ)Φ(INVENTORIES) + (1/θ)Ψ(σ) - δ(s-f).  (9) 
                                                           
19 See, for example, the discussion of Figure 1.22 in the World Economic Outlook April 2006, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington, DC. 
20 In theory, when estimating Equation (9), if inventories are already in the equation, the spread does not need to be 
added separately. But any available measure of inventories is likely to be incomplete, which might provide a reason 
to include the spread separately as a measure of speculative demand. 
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Finally, to allow for the possibility of bandwagon and bubble effects, and a separate effect of 
inflation on commodity prices, we can use the alternative expectations Equation (5’) in place of 
(5). Equation (9) then becomes: 
 
q = C - (1/θ)[i-E(Δp)] + (1/θ)γY - (Φ/θ) (INVENTORIES)  
+ (Ψ/θ) σ - δ(s-f) + λ E(Δp) + (δ /θ)(Δs-1).         (9') 
 
It is this equation – augmented by a hopefully well-behaved residual term – which we wish to 
investigate. 
  Each of the variables on the right-hand side of Equation (9) could easily be considered 
endogenous. This must be considered a limitation of our analysis. In future extensions, we would 
like to consider estimating three simultaneous equations: one for expectations formation, one for 
the inventory arbitrage condition and one for commodity price determination. However, we are 
short of plausibly exogenous variables with which to identify such equations. From the 
viewpoint of an individual commodity though, aggregate variables such as the real interest rate 
and GDP can reasonably be considered exogenous.
21 
3. The Data Set 
We begin with a preliminary examination of the data set, starting with the commodity 
price series and the macroeconomic determinants of commodity prices. 
 
21 Also inventories could perhaps be considered pre-determined in higher frequency data, since it takes time to make 
big additions to, or subtractions from, inventories. But in this paper we use annual data.   14
                                                          
Figure 1 contains time-series plots for four variables of interest. The top pair portray the 
natural logarithms of two popular commodity price indices (the Dow-Jones/AIG and the 
Bridge/CRB indices). Both series have been deflated by the US GDP chain price index to make 
them real. Below them are portrayed: the annualised realised US real interest rate (defined as the 
3-month Treasury-bill rate at auction less the percentage change in the US chain price index) and 
the growth rate of real World GDP (taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators). All data are annual and span 1960 through 2008. 
  We follow the literature and measure commodity prices in US dollar terms and use real 
US interest rates. We think this is a reasonable way to proceed. If commodity markets are 
nationally segmented, by trade barriers and transport costs, then local commodity prices are 
determined by domestic real interest rates, domestic economic activity and so on. It is reasonable 
to assume, however, that world commodity markets are closer to integrated than they are to 
being segmented. Indeed, many assume that the law of one price holds closely for 
commodities.
22 In this case, the nominal price of wheat in Australian dollars is the nominal price 
in terms of US dollars multiplied by the nominal exchange rate.
23 Equivalently, the real price of 
wheat in Australia is the real price in the US times the real exchange rate.
24  
Figure 1 contains few surprises. The sharp run-up in real commodity prices in the 
early/mid-1970s is clearly visible as is the most recent rise. Real interest rates were low during 
 
22 For example, Phillips and Pippenger (2005) and Protopapdakis and Stoll (1983, 1986).  
23 For example, Mundell (2002).  
24 An application of the Dornbusch overshooting model can give us the prediction that the real exchange rate is 
proportionate to the real interest differential. It thus turns out that the real commodity price in local currency can be 
determined by the US real interest rate (and other determinants of the real US price) together with the differential in 
real interest rates between the domestic country and the US. Equations along these lines are estimated in Frankel 
(2008; Table 7.3) for real commodity price indices in eight floating-rate countries: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. In almost every case, both the US real interest rate 
and the local-US real interest differential are found to have significant negative effects on local real commodity 
prices, just as hypothesised.   15
both periods of time, and high during the early 1980s, as expected. Global business cycle 
movements are also clearly present in the data. 
Figure 2 provides simple scatter-plots of both real commodity price series against the two 
key macroeconomic phenomena. The bivariate relationships seem weak; real commodity prices 
are slightly negatively linked to real interest rates and positively to world growth. We interpret 
this to mean that there is plenty of room for microeconomic determinants of real commodity 
prices, above and beyond macroeconomic phenomena.
25 Accordingly, we now turn from 
aggregate commodity price indices and explanatory variables to commodity-specific data. 
We have collected data on prices and microeconomic fundamentals for twelve 
commodities of interest.
26 Seven are agricultural, including a number of crops (corn, cotton, oats, 
soybeans and wheat), as well as two livestock variables (live cattle and hogs). We also have 
petroleum and four non-ferrous metals (copper, gold, platinum, and silver). We chose the span, 
frequency, and choice of commodities so as to maximise data availability. The series are annual, 
and typically run from some time after the early 1960s through 2008.
27 
Figure 3 provides time-series plots of the natural logarithm of commodity prices, each 
deflated by the US GDP chain price index. The log of the real price shows the boom of the 1970s 
in most commodities and the second boom that culminated in 2008 – especially in the minerals: 
copper, gold, oil and platinum.  
Figures 4 through 7 portray the commodity-specific fundamentals used as explanatory 
variables when we estimate Equation (9). We measure volatility as the standard deviation of the 
                                                           
25 Frankel (2008a) finds stronger evidence, especially for the relationship of commodity price indices and real 
interest rates. 
26 We are forced to drop gold from the regression analysis since we have no data on gold inventories. 
27 Further details concerning the series, and the data set itself, are available on the second author's website. 
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spot price over the past year.
28 According to our data, inventories for some commodities in 2008 
were fairly high historically after all: corn, cotton, hogs, oil, and soybeans.
29 The future-spot 
spread alternates frequently between normal backwardation and contango. As one can see, the 
political risk variables are relatively limited in availability; accordingly, we do not include them 
in our basic equation for estimation, but use them for sensitivity analysis. Imaginative eyeballing 
can convince one that risks for the top oil producing countries were high around the time of the 
1973 Arab oil embargo and the aftermath of the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.  
Finally, our preferred measure of real activity is plotted in Figure 8; (log) real world 
GDP. This has the advantage of including developing countries including China and India. Of 
course all economic activity variables have positive trends. One must detrend them to be useful 
measures of the business cycle; we include a linear trend term in all our empirical work. 
(Another way to think of the trend term is as capturing the trend in supply or storage capacity, or 
perhaps the long-run equilibrium commodity price.) The growth rate of world GDP is also 
shown in Figure 8, as is world output detrended via the HP-filter. Finally, we also experiment 
with the output gap, which is available only for the OECD collectively, and only since 1970. In 
any of the measures of real economic activity one can see the recessions of 1975, 1982, 1991, 
2001 and 2008.
30 
4. Estimation of the Commodity Price Determination Equation 
  As a warm-up, Table 1 reports results of bivariate regressions; we show coefficients 
along with robust standard errors. The correlation with real economic activity is reported in the 
                                                           
28 Alternative measurements are possible; in the future, we hope to use the implicit forward-looking expected 
volatility that can be extracted from options prices. 
29 We use world inventories insofar as possible, but substitute US inventories when this is missing (specifically, in 
the cases of copper, live cattle and hogs, oats, platinum and silver). We have no data on gold inventories whatsoever. 
30 In the past, we have also used US GDP, G-7 GDP, and industrial production (for the US as well as for advanced 
countries in the aggregate); the latter has the advantage of being available monthly.  
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first column. Surprisingly, real prices are not significantly correlated with global output for most 
commodities; the exceptions are oats, silver and soybeans.
31 Volatility shows a positive bivariate 
correlation with all prices, significantly so for nine out of eleven commodities. The correlations 
with the spot-futures spread and inventories are also almost always of the hypothesised sign 
(negative), and significant for a number of commodities. The real interest rate, too, shows the 
hypothesised negative correlation for eight out of eleven commodity prices, but is significantly 
different from zero for only one commodity, hogs. Political risk is significantly different from 
zero in just four cases: higher political risk (a fall in our index) appears to raise demand for corn, 
cotton and soybeans (a negative coefficient in the last column of Table 1), but to lower it for 
cattle. As with volatility, the theoretical prediction is ambiguous: the positive correlation is 
consistent with the convenience yield effect, and the negative correlation with the risk premium 
effect.
32 
The theory made it clear that prices depend on a variety of independent factors 
simultaneously, so these bivariate correlations may tell us little. Accordingly, Table 2a presents 
the multivariate estimation of Equation (9).
33 World output now shows the hypothesised positive 
coefficient in nine out of the eleven commodities, and is statistically significant in four of them: 
corn, cattle, oats and soybeans. That is, economic activity significantly raises demand for these 
commodities. The coefficient on volatility is statistically greater than zero for five commodities: 
 
31 When we substitute G-7 real GDP, the three commodity prices that showed significant correlations – not reported 
here – were: corn, cotton and soybeans. We view global output as a better measure than G-7 GDP or industrial 
production, because it is more comprehensive. 
32 The results were a bit better when the same tests were run in terms of first differences (on data through 2007, not 
here reported but available in Table 1b of Frankel and Rose 2009). Correlation of price changes with G-7 GDP 
growth [Note to Authors to check that they meant ‘growth’ when said ‘changes’]was always positive, though again 
significant only for corn, cotton and soybeans. Correlations with volatility, the spread, and inventories each show up 
as significant in five or six commodities out of 11 (and with the expected sign). 
33 We exclude the political risk measure. It gives generally unclear results, perhaps in part because its coverage is 
incomplete and/or because of the possible theoretical ambiguity mentioned earlier. Volatility seems to be better at 
capturing risk. A useful extension would be to use implicit volatility from options prices, which might combine the 
virtues of both the volatility and political risk variables.   18
copper, platinum, silver, soybeans and wheat. Evidently, at least for these five goods, volatility 
raises the demand to hold inventories, via the convenience yield. The spread and inventories are 
usually of the hypothesised negative sign (intuitively, backwardation signals expected future 
reduction in commodity values while high inventory levels imply that storage costs are high). 
However, the effects are significant only for a few commodities. The coefficient on the real 
interest rate is of the hypothesised negative sign in seven of the eleven commodities, but 
significantly so only for two: cattle and hogs. Overall, the macro variables work best for cattle. 
They work less well for the metals than for agricultural commodities, which would be surprising 
except that the same pattern appeared in Frankel (2008). 
When the regressions are run in first differences, in Table 2b, the output coefficient is 
now always of the hypothesised positive sign. But the coefficient is smaller in magnitude and 
significant less often. Volatility is still significantly positive for five commodities, the spot-
futures spread significantly negative for four, and inventories significantly negative for two. Any 
effect of the real interest rate has vanished. 
  Analysing commodities one at a time obviously does not produce strong evidence 
overall. This may not be surprising. For one thing, because we are working with annual data 
here, each regression has relatively few observations. For another thing, we know that we have 
not captured idiosyncratic forces such as the weather events that lead to bad harvests in some 
regions or the political unrest that closes mines in other parts of the world. We hope to learn 
more when we combine data from different commodities together. 
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Tables 3a and 3b are probably our most important findings. They combine data from 
different commodities into one large panel data set.
34 In the panel setting, with all the data 
brought to bear, the theory is supported more strongly. The basic equation, with fixed effects for 
each commodity, is portrayed in the first row. The coefficients on world output and volatility 
have the expected positive effects; the latter is significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent 
level, while the former misses significance by a whisker (the significance level is 5.3 per cent). 
The coefficients on the spread and inventories are significantly different from zero with the 
hypothesised negative effects; and the coefficient on the real interest rate, though not significant, 
is of the hypothesised negative sign. Our basic equation also fits the data reasonably; the within-
commodity R
2=0.58, though the between-commodity R
2 is a much lower 0.15 (as expected). The 
fitted values are graphed against the actual (log real) commodity prices in the top-left graph of 
Figure 9. (The panel immediately to the right shows the results when the fixed effects are 
removed from the fitted values.) 
Table 3a also reports a variety of extensions and sensitivity tests in the lower rows. The 
third row adds year-specific effects to commodity-specific fixed effects. The two 
macroeconomic variables, world output and the real interest rate, necessarily drop out in the 
presence of these time-fixed effects; by definition they do not vary within a cross-section of 
commodities. But it is reassuring that the three remaining (microeconomic) variables – volatility, 
the spread, and inventories – retain their significant effects. The next row drops the spot-forward 
spread from the specification on the grounds that its role may already be played by inventories 
(see Equation (7)). The effects of inventories and the other variables remain essentially 
unchanged. Next, we add the political risk variable back in. It is statistically insignificant, but in 
 
34 Unless otherwise noted, in our panel estimation we always include a common trend and commodity-specific 
intercepts; we do not report these coefficients.   20
its presence the world output variable becomes more significant than ever. We then try four 
alternative measures of global economic activity in place of the log of real world GDP: 1) the 
growth rate of real world GDP, 2) the OECD output gap; 3) Hodrick-Prescott filtered GDP, and 
4) log real world GDP with a quadratic trend. None works as well as the level of real GDP, but 
the microeconomic effects are essentially unchanged.  
Table 3b repeats the exercise of Table 3a, but using first-differences rather than (log-) 
levels, with similar results. In particular, the signs for the microeconomic determinants are 
almost always as hypothesised, as is the effect of economic activity. Most of the coefficients are 
also significantly different from zero, though the effect of activity on commodity prices is much 
smaller than in Table 3a. The estimated effects of real interest rates are often positive, although 
never significant. 
Table 4 retains the panel estimation technique of Tables 3a and 3b, but reports the 
outcome of adding the rate of change of the spot commodity price over the preceding year to the 
standard list of determinants. The rationale is to test the theory of destabilising speculation by 
looking for evidence of bandwagon effects, as in Equation (9’). The lagged change in the spot 
price is indeed highly significant statistically, even if time-fixed effects are added, data after 
2003 are dropped, or auto-correlated residuals are included in the estimation. It is also significant 
regardless of whether the spread or political risk variables are included or not, and regardless of 
the measure of economic activity. Evidently, alongside the regular mechanism of regressive 
expectations that is implicitly built into the basic model (a form of stabilising expectations), the 
results in Table 4 show that there is also a mechanism of extrapolative expectations (which is 
capable of producing self-confirming bubble effects). Table 5 reports the result of adding a separate coefficient for the US inflation rate, above 
and beyond the real interest rate (and the other standard commodity price determinants). Thus 
there are two separate measures of the monetary policy stance. Recall that the hypothesised role 
of the real interest rate is to pull the current real commodity price q away from its long run 
equilibrium q, while the role of the expected inflation rate is to raise the long run equilibrium 
price q
                                                          
to the extent that commodities are considered useful as a hedge against inflation. In our 
default specification, and under almost all of the variations, the coefficient on inflation is greater 
than zero and highly significant. The result suggests that commodities are indeed valued as a 
hedge against inflation. The positive effect of inflation offers a third purely macroeconomic 
explanation for commodity price movements (alongside real interest rates, which do not work 
very well in our results, and growth which does).
 35,36 
Tables 6a and 6b report the results for a variety of aggregate commodity price indices 
that we have created. Prices and each of the relevant determinant variables have been aggregated 
using commodity-specific data and (time-invariant) weights from a particular index. We use 
weights from five popular indices (Dow Jones/AIG; S&P/GCSI; CRB Reuters/Jeffries; Grilli-
Yang; and the Economist), and also create an equally-weighted index. Since these rely on a 
number of commodities for which we do not have data, our constructed indices are by no means 
equal to the original indices (such as those portrayed in Figures 1 and 2). Further, the span of 
data available over time varies by commodity. Accordingly, we create three different indices for 
each weighting scheme; the narrowest (in that it relies on the fewest commodities) stretches back 
to 1964, while broader indices are available for shorter spans of time (we create indices that 
 
35 For example, Calvo (2008). 
36 Adding either a bandwagon or inflationary effect improves the fit of our equation: the within R
2 rises from 0.58 to 
0.66 in both cases. Fitted values for both perturbations are graphed against actual prices in the bottom panels of 
Figure 9. 
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begin in 1973 and 1984). We use the same weights for prices and their fundamental 
determinants. The benefit from this aggregation is that some of the influences that are particular 
to individual commodities, such as weather, may wash out when we look at aggregate indices. 
The cost is that we are left with many fewer observations. 
In the first column of Table 6a – which reports results in levels – the real GDP output 
coefficient always has the hypothesised positive sign. However, it is only significant in Table 6b, 
where the estimation is in terms of first differences. The volatility coefficient is almost always 
statistically greater than zero in both Tables 6a and 6b. The coefficient on the spot-futures spread 
is almost always negative, but not usually significantly different from zero. The inventory 
coefficient is also almost always negative, and sometimes significant. The real interest rate is 
never significant, though the sign is generally negative (and always negative in Table 6a). The 
lack of statistical significance probably arises because now that we are dealing with short time 
series of aggregate indices, the number of observations is smaller than in the panel analysis; this 
is especially true in the cases where we start the sample later. 
Although we have already reported results of regressions run in both levels and first 
differences, a complete analysis requires that we examine the stationarity or nonstationarity of 
the series more formally. Tables in Appendix B tabulate Phillips-Perron tests for unit roots in our 
individual variables; the aggregate series are handled in Table B1a, while the commodity-
specific results are in Table B1b. Table B1c is the analogue that tests for common panel unit 
roots. The tests often fail to reject unit roots (though not for the spread and volatility). One 
school of thought would doubt, on a priori grounds, that variables such as the real interest rate 
could truly follow a random walk. The other school of thought says that one must go wherever 
the data instruct. Here we pursue the implication of unit roots to be safe, as a robustness check if   23
                                                          
nothing else. However, we are reluctant to over-interpret our results, especially given the limited 
number of time-series observations.
37 
Tables B2a – B2c report related tests of cointegration. We generally find cointegration in 
commodity-specific models, but have weaker results in our panel cointegration result. It is not 
clear to us whether this is the result of low power, the absence of fixed effects or some other mis-
specification. Still, Table B3 reports results from commodity-specific vector error correction 
(VECM) models. As in some of the previous tests, the three variables that are most consistently 
significant and of the hypothesised sign are the spread, the volatility and inventories. We view 
this as a reassuring corroboration of the panel estimation we have already documented. 
5. Summary and Conclusion 
  This paper has presented a model that can accommodate each of the prominent 
explanations that were given for the run-up in prices of most agricultural and mineral 
commodities that culminated in the 2008 spike: global economic activity, easy monetary policy, 
and destabilising speculation. Our model includes both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
determinants of real commodity prices. 
The theoretical model is built around the ‘arbitrage’ decision faced by any firm holding 
inventories. This is the tradeoff between the cost of carrying the inventory on the one hand (the 
interest rate plus the cost of storage) versus the convenience yield and forward-spot spread (or, if 
unhedged, the expected capital gain adjusted for the risk premium) on the other hand. A second 
equation completes the picture; the real commodity price is expected to regress gradually back to 
its long run equilibrium (at least absent bandwagon effects). The reduced form equation 
 
37 Studies of the time series properties of real commodity prices can find a negative trend, positive trend, random 
walk, or mean reversion, depending on the sample period available when the authors do their study. Examples 
include Cuddington and Urzua (1989) and Reinhart and Wickham (1994).   24
expresses the real commodity price as a function of the real interest rate, storage costs, 
convenience yield and the risk premium. The level of inventories is a ready stand-in for storage 
costs. The empirical significance of the inventory variable suggests that the data and relationship 
are meaningful, notwithstanding fears that the available measures of inventories are 
incomplete.
38 Global economic activity is an important determinant of the convenience yield. 
Measures of political risk and price uncertainty are other potentially important determinants of 
both convenience yield and the risk premium. 
  Our strongest results come about when we bring together as much data as possible, in the 
panel estimates of Tables 3a, 3b, 4 and 5. Our annual empirical results show support for the 
influence of economic activity, inventories, uncertainty, the spread and recent spot price changes. 
The significance of the inventories variable supports the legitimacy of arguments by others who 
have used observed inventory levels to guage the roles of speculation or interest rates. There was 
little support in these new annual results for the hypothesis that easy monetary policy and low 
real interest rates are an important source of upward pressure on real commodity prices, beyond 
any effect they might have via real economic activity and inflation (This result differs from more 
positive results of previous papers.) We also find evidence that commodity prices are driven in 
part by bandwagon effects and by inflation per se. 
  A number of possible extensions remain for future research. These include: 1) estimation 
at monthly or quarterly frequency (the big problem here is likely to be data availability, 
especially for any reasonably long span of time) ; 2) testing for nonlinearity in the effects of 
growth, uncertainty and (especially) inventories; 3) using implicit volatility inferred from 
commodity options prices as the measure of uncertainty; 4) using survey data to measure 
                                                           
38 We are implicitly considering inventories relative to full capacity, but explicit adjustment would improve the 
measurement, if the appropriate data on storage capacity could be found. 
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commodity price expectations explicitly; and 5) simultaneous estimation of the three equations: 
expectations formation (regressive versus bandwagon), the inventory arbitrage condition, and the 
equation for determination of the real commodity price. The future agenda remains large. 
What caused the run-up in commodities prices in the 2000s? One explanation is the 
recent rapid global growth – as in the 1970s – aided now by China and India. Presumably, then 
the abrupt decline in the latter part of 2008, and even the partial recovery in the spring of 2009, 
could be explained by the rapidly evolving prospects for the real economy. But this story is still 
not able to explain the acceleration of commodity prices between mid 2007 and the peak around 
the second half of 2008, a time when growth prospects were already being downgraded in 
response to the US sub-prime mortgage crisis. Of the two candidate theories to explain that 
interval – low real interest rates and a speculative bubble – there is more support for the latter in 
this paper, in the form of bandwagon effects. But a more definitive judgment on both may have 
to await higher-frequency data.   26
Table 1: Commodity by Commodity Bivariate Estimates, Levels  
 Real  World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories
- 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
- 
Risk 
- 
Corn  -1.64** 
(.59) 
2.08* 
(.96) 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.21 
(.12) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.14** 
(.05) 
Copper  -1.36 
(.85) 
2.74** 
(.58) 
-.008* 
(.003) 
-.28** 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.02) 
-.16 
(.12) 
Cotton  -1.35* 
(.62) 
1.11** 
(.39) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.25 
(.13) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.14** 
(.05) 
Cattle  -1.77 
(1.27) 
.10 
(.68) 
-.007** 
(.002) 
.11 
(.41) 
-.03 
(.02) 
1.77** 
(.50) 
Hogs  -1.66 
(1.90) 
1.72* 
(.67) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
.23 
(.48) 
-.05** 
(.01) 
.08 
(.06) 
Oats  1.51** 
(.56) 
4.17* 
(1.74) 
-.007* 
(.003) 
-.20 
(.11) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.03 
(.11) 
Oil  -1.36 
(6.18) 
.49 
(1.26) 
-.004 
(.003) 
-3.39 
(4.03) 
-.01 
(.06) 
.16 
(.08) 
Platinum  3.79 
(3.09) 
3.24** 
(.53) 
.000 
(.005) 
-.17** 
(.03) 
.01 
(.02) 
.10 
(.06) 
Silver  6.69** 
(2.26) 
4.25** 
(.71) 
.003 
(.008) 
-.66** 
(.22) 
.03 
(.03) 
-.46 
(.42) 
Soybeans  2.48** 
(.59) 
3.33** 
(.49) 
-.007 
(.004) 
-.07 
(.10) 
-.03 
(.02) 
-.10** 
(.03) 
Wheat  3.57 
(3.57) 
2.48** 
(.84) 
-.002 
(.006) 
-1.03** 
(.22) 
-.01 
(.04) 
.63 
(.43) 
Annual data. Each cell is a slope coefficient from a bivariate regression of the real price on the 
relevant regressor, allowing for an intercept and trend. ** (*) ≡ significantly different from zero 
at .01 (.05) level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressand: log real commodity price. 
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Table 2a: Multivariate Regressions, Commodity by Commodity Estimates, Levels  
 Real 
World GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real Interest 
Rate 
- 
Corn  1.53* 
(.69) 
1.52 
(.89) 
-.003 
(.003) 
-.18 
(.17) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Copper  .03 
(.68) 
1.92** 
(.54) 
-.005 
(.003) 
-.21** 
(.06_ 
-.03 
(.01) 
Cotton  .66 
(.85) 
1.07 
(.57) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.12 
(.14) 
.01 
(.01) 
Cattle  7.37** 
(1.03) 
-.65 
(.34) 
-.007 
(.002) 
2.37** 
(.48) 
-.06** 
(.01) 
Hogs  -.57 
(1.64) 
.64 
(.71) 
-.004* 
(.002) 
.18 
(.31) 
-.03** 
(.01) 
Oats  2.66** 
(.71) 
3.28 
(1.69) 
-.006** 
(.002) 
-.59** 
(.11) 
-.02 
(.01) 
Oil  .05 
(8.60) 
.57 
(1.69) 
-.003 
(.003) 
-2.52 
(5.02) 
-.01 
(.07) 
Platinum  1.22 
(2.17) 
1.78* 
(.87) 
.002 
(.002) 
-.21** 
(.03) 
.08** 
(.01) 
Silver  2.69 
(2.13) 
3.32** 
(.73) 
.003 
(.003) 
-.37* 
(.18) 
.01 
(.03) 
Soybeans  1.94** 
(.70) 
2.68** 
(.55) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.05 
(.07) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Wheat  -5.98* 
(2.79) 
1.90** 
(.47) 
.008* 
(.003) 
-1.42** 
(.27) 
.03 
(.02) 
Annual data. OLS, commodity by commodity (so each row represents a different regression). 
** (*) means significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Intercept and linear time trend included, not recorded. Regressand: log real 
commodity price.   28
Table 2b: Commodity by Commodity Multivariate Results, First-Differences 
 Real 
World GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real Interest 
Rate 
- 
Corn  .02 
(.02) 
1.01 
(.53) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.21 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Copper  .07** 
(.02) 
.44 
(.27) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.08 
(.07) 
.03 
(.02) 
Cotton  .01 
(.02) 
1.05** 
(.37) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.02 
(.13) 
.02 
(.03) 
Cattle  .01 
(.02) 
-.46 
(.50) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-1.26 
(.96) 
-.00 
(.01) 
Hogs  .02 
(.03) 
-.76 
(.85) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
-.56 
(.50) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Oats  .03 
(.02) 
1.76* 
(.71) 
-.005** 
(.001) 
-.65** 
(.12) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Oil  .10 
(.06) 
-.34 
(.49) 
-.003** 
(.001) 
.02 
(1.24) 
-.04 
(.04) 
Platinum  .03 
(.03) 
1.28** 
(.44) 
.000 
(.001) 
-.02 
(.07) 
.02 
(.03) 
Silver  .01 
(.04) 
1.98** 
(.47) 
.003 
(.003) 
-.03 
(.10) 
.01 
(.04) 
Soybeans  .05** 
(.02) 
1.68** 
(.37) 
-.001 
(.001) 
.01 
(.08) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Wheat  .03 
(.04) 
.90 
(.53) 
.004 
(.002) 
-.89** 
(.23) 
-.02 
(.04) 
Annual data. OLS, commodity by commodity (so each row represents a different regression).  
** (*) means significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 Intercept and linear time trend included, not reported. Regressand: first-difference in log real 
commodity price.   29
Table 3a: Panel Data Results, Levels  
 Real  World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real Interest 
Rate 
- 
Risk 
- 
Basic  .60 
(.27) 
2.29** 
(.40) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
Add Time Fixed 
Effects 
n/a 1.61** 
(.29) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.01) 
n/a  
Drop Spread  .58 
(.30) 
2.36** 
(.38) 
n/a -.15** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
Add Risk  1.00** 
(.23) 
1.67** 
(.57) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
-.15** 
(.03) 
.00 
(.01) 
-.05 
(.04) 
Growth (not log) 
of World GDP 
-.01 
(.01) 
2.36** 
(.40) 
-.003 
(.001) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
OECD Output 
Gap 
.01 
(.01) 
2.34** 
(.44) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
HP-Filtered GDP  2.35 
(1.47) 
2.32** 
(.43) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
-.14** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
Add Quadratic 
Trend 
.48 
(.40) 
2.30** 
(.40) 
-.003* 
(.001) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
-.01 
(.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3b: Panel Data Results, First-Differences  
 Real  World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real Interest 
Rate 
- 
Risk 
- 
Basic  .03** 
(.01) 
.75** 
(.24) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.10* 
(.05) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
Add Time Fixed 
Effects 
n/a .53** 
(.18) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.07 
(.04) 
n/a  
Drop Spread  .04** 
(.01) 
 -.0020** 
(.0005) 
-.10 
(.05) 
-.00 
(.01) 
 
Add Risk  .03** 
(.01) 
.65* 
(.28) 
-.0018** 
(.0005) 
-.15* 
(.07) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.02) 
OECD Output 
Gap 
.03** 
(.01) 
.77* 
(.25) 
-.0018** 
(.0005) 
-.12* 
(.04) 
.01 
(.01) 
 
HP-Filtered GDP  4.91** 
(.97) 
.78* 
(.23) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.12* 
(.04) 
.01 
(.01) 
 
Add Quadratic 
Trend 
.03** 
(.01) 
.75** 
(.24) 
-.002** 
(.001) 
-.10* 
(.05) 
.00 
(.01) 
 
Regressand: log real commodity price (3a), or its first-difference (3b). Annual data.  
** (*) ≡ significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Commodity-specific fixed intercepts and trend included, not reported.    30
Table 4: Testing for Bandwagon Effects  
 Real 
World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-
Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories
- 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
- 
Risk
- 
Lagged 
Nominal 
Change  
Basic  .50 
(.27) 
1.84** 
(.40) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.02) 
.00 
(.01) 
 .0061** 
(.0005) 
Add Time Fixed 
Effects 
n/a 1.37** 
(.28) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.12** 
(.01) 
n/a   .0050** 
(.0008) 
Drop Spread  .48 
(.32) 
2.01** 
(.37) 
 -.14** 
(.02) 
-.00 
(.01) 
 .0053** 
(.0005) 
Add Risk  .93** 
(.24) 
1.25 
(.58) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.03) 
.01 
(.01) 
-.03 
(.04) 
.0050** 
(.0005) 
Growth (not log) of 
World GDP 
-.01 
(.01) 
1.90** 
(.40) 
-.005** 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
 .0061** 
(.0005) 
OECD Output Gap  -.00 
(.01) 
1.90** 
(.43) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
 .0063** 
(.0005) 
HP-Filtered GDP  -.71 
(1.58) 
1.92** 
(.42) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
 .0062** 
(.0005) 
Add Quadratic 
Trend 
.26 
(.37) 
1.85** 
(.41) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.13** 
(.02) 
.01 
(.01) 
 .0062** 
(.0005) 
Drop post-2003 
data 
1.21** 
(.28) 
1.26 
(.58) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
-.11** 
(.04) 
.01 
(.01) 
 .0049** 
(.0005) 
With AR(1) 
Residuals 
2.08* 
(.81) 
.89** 
(.13) 
-.0033** 
(.00004) 
-.10** 
(.03) 
.00 
(.01) 
 .0031** 
(.0004) 
Annual data. ** (*) ≡ significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. Commodity-specific fixed intercepts and trend included, not reported. 
Regressand: log real commodity price. Far right-hand column is coefficient for lagged 
percentage change in nominal spot commodity price.   31
 Table 5: Adding Inflation to the Specification 
 Real  World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories
- 
Risk
- 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
- 
Inflation 
Basic  -2.11** 
(.61) 
2.12** 
(.27) 
-.0032** 
(.0007) 
-.14** 
(.02) 
 .019 
(.012) 
.082** 
(.015) 
Drop Spread  -2.04** 
(.63) 
2.21** 
(.26) 
 -.15** 
(.02) 
 .015 
(.012) 
.079** 
(.015) 
Add Risk  -1.25* 
(.44) 
1.57** 
(.44) 
-.0031** 
(.0006) 
-.14** 
(.02) 
-.02 
(.04) 
.020 
(.014) 
.067** 
(.015) 
Growth (not log) of 
World GDP 
.02 
(.01) 
2.01** 
(.32) 
-.0027** 
(.0007) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
 .006 
(.011) 
.058** 
(.010) 
OECD Output Gap  -.00 
(.01) 
2.09** 
(.28) 
-.0030** 
(.0007) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
 .014 
(.012) 
.083** 
(.014) 
HP-Filtered GDP  .19 
(1.64) 
2.03** 
(.33) 
-.0031** 
(.0008) 
-.15** 
(.02) 
 .005 
(.013) 
.051** 
(.009) 
Add Quadratic 
Trend 
-2.47** 
(.76) 
2.14** 
(.27) 
-.0032** 
(.0006) 
-.14** 
(.02) 
 .017 
(.011) 
.085** 
(.015) 
Annual data: robust standard errors in parentheses; ** (*) means significantly different from zero at .01 
(.05) significance level. Regressand: log real commodity price. Commodity-specific fixed intercepts and 
trend included, not recorded.  
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Table 6a: Commodity Price Index Results (Levels)  
 Period 
After 
Real World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-
Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
- 
Dow-Jones/AIG 1984  3.52 
(2.24) 
1.33** 
(.16) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.21 
(.19) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Dow-Jones/AIG 1973  2.11 
(1.13) 
1.32** 
(.11) 
.000 
(.002) 
-.30* 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Dow-Jones/AIG 1964  .44 
(.77) 
1.28** 
(.15) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.11 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
S&P GCSI  1984  4.83 
(2.78) 
.17 
(.35) 
-.004** 
(.001) 
1.01** 
(.31) 
-.01 
(.04) 
S&P GCSI  1973  2.18 
(1.14) 
1.29** 
(.10) 
-.000 
(.002) 
-.28* 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
S&P GCSI  1964  .42 
(.75) 
1.31** 
(.15) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.17 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
CRB 
Reuters/Jefferies 
1984  3.64 
(2.58) 
.99** 
(.23) 
-.003 
(.002) 
.09 
(.25) 
-.01 
(.03) 
CRB 
Reuters/Jefferies 
1973  2.24 
(1.31) 
1.27** 
(.10) 
-.000 
(.001) 
-.25 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
CRB 
Reuters/Jefferies 
1964  .47 
(.71) 
1.32** 
(.15) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.16 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Grilli-Yang 1984  3.83 
(2.64) 
1.42** 
(.14) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.25 
(.14) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Grilli-Yang 1973  2.61 
(1.76) 
1.18** 
(.13) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.17 
(.16) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Grilli-Yang 1964 .32 
(.67) 
1.27** 
(.17) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.18 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Economist 1984  3.76 
(2.55) 
1.39** 
(.11) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.22 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Economist 1964  .37 
(.72) 
1.29** 
(.16) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.14 
(.12) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Equal 1984  3.26 
(1.76) 
1.64** 
(.16) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.50** 
(.16) 
-.01 
(.02) 
Equal 1973  2.09 
(1.22) 
1.36** 
(.15) 
-.000 
(.002) 
-.36* 
(.15) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Equal 1964  .43 
(.61) 
1.40** 
(.17) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.26 
(.13) 
-.01 
(.01) 
Annual data. ** (*) ≡ significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept and trend included, not reported.  
Price indices and micro-determinants are weighted averages (according to different schemes). 
Regressand: constructed log real commodity price index.   33
Table 6b: Commodity Price Index Results (First-Differences)  
 Period 
After 
Real World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-
Future 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real 
Interest 
Rate 
- 
Dow-Jones/AIG 1984  .07** 
(.02) 
.22 
(.48) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.35* 
(.14) 
-.02 
(.02) 
Dow-Jones/AIG 1973  .03* 
(.01) 
1.55** 
(.39) 
.000 
(.002) 
-.29* 
(.12) 
-.00 
(.02) 
Dow-Jones/AIG 1964  .04** 
(.01) 
1.98** 
(.49) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.09 
(.11) 
.00 
(.01) 
S&P GCSI  1984  .10* 
(.04) 
-.24 
(.44) 
-.002* 
(.001) 
-.66 
(.66) 
-.04 
(.03) 
S&P GCSI  1973  .03* 
(.02) 
1.20* 
(.44) 
.000 
(.002) 
-.29* 
(.14) 
-.00 
(.02) 
S&P GCSI  1964  .04* 
(.02) 
1.81** 
(.50) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.13 
(.11) 
.00 
(.01) 
CRB 
Reuters/Jefferies 
1984  .08** 
(.03) 
-.21 
(.43) 
-.002 
(.001) 
-.43* 
(.19) 
-.03 
(.02) 
CRB 
Reuters/Jefferies 
1973  .03 
(.02) 
1.35** 
(.42) 
.000 
(.002) 
-.25 
(.13) 
.00 
(.02) 
CRB 
Reuters/Jefferies 
1964  .03** 
(.01) 
1.87** 
(.45) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.12 
(.10) 
.01 
(.01) 
Grilli-Yang 1984  .03* 
(.02) 
1.50* 
(.61) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.22 
(.13) 
.02 
(.02) 
Grilli-Yang 1973 .03 
(.02) 
1.60** 
(.42) 
-.001 
(.002) 
-.17 
(.14) 
.02 
(.02) 
Grilli-Yang 1964 .03 
(.02) 
1.25** 
(.39) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.12 
(.12) 
.02 
(.01) 
Economist 1984  .03* 
(.02) 
2.13** 
(.66) 
-.001 
(.001) 
-.20* 
(.10) 
.02 
(.02) 
Economist 1964  .04** 
(.01) 
1.79** 
(.41) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.10 
(.10) 
.01 
(.01) 
Equal 1984  .06* 
(.02) 
1.59** 
(.50) 
-.003 
(.002) 
-.35** 
(.09) 
.00 
(.02) 
Equal 1973  .03 
(.02) 
1.84** 
(.48) 
.000 
(.002) 
-.35* 
(.13) 
.00 
(.02) 
Equal 1964  .03* 
(.01) 
1.93** 
(.46) 
-.002 
(.002) 
-.22 
(.11) 
.00 
(.01) 
Annual data. ** (*) ≡ significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level.  
 Robust standard errors in parentheses. Intercept and trend included, not reported.  
Price indices and micro-determinants are weighted averages (according to different schemes). 
Regressand: constructed first-difference log real commodity price index. Time Series Data Plots
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Bivariate Macro Scatter Plots
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Figure 2 Log Real Spot Price
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Figure 3 
Volatility
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Figure 4 Log Inventory
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Future-Spot Spread
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Figure 6 Risk
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Real Activity
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Figure 8 Fitted Against Actual (Log Real) Commodity Prices
Basic Equation, Table 3
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Appendix A: Predictive Bias in Commodity Futures Markets 
Introduction 
This appendix briefly reviews the literature on whether forward and futures prices are 
unbiased forecasts of future spot prices for commodities, and – where there is systematic bias – 
what the source might be.  
Commodity futures can deliver both storage facilitation and a forward pricing role in 
their price discovery function.
39 Accordingly there are two main theories in commodity futures 
price determination: 
1.  The theory of storage or costs-of-carry models (Working, 1949; Brenan, 1958), which 
explain the difference in the contemporaneous spot price and futures price of 
commodities by the net costs of carrying stock. These are composed of: 1) interest 
foregone (had they been sold earlier); 2) warehousing costs; and 3) the convenience yield. 
2.  The view that the futures price has two components (Breeden, 1980; Hazuka, 1984): the 
expected risk premium (Keynes’ ‘normal backwardation theory’), and the forecast of 
future spot price. Under this theory, the futures price is a biased estimate of future spot 
price because of the risk premium – insurance being sold by the speculators to the 
hedgers. 
 
Is the Futures Price a Biased Predictor of the Future Spot Price?  
Some studies address the question of unbiasedness of futures price (in forecasting spot 
prices) by examining the cointegration between futures and spot prices; this allows one to deal 
with problems of the non-stationary nature of commodities price (for example, Covey and 
Bessler, 1995; Brenner and Konner, 1995; Fortenbery and Zapata, 1998; and Yang, 2001). 
Moosa and Al-Loughani (1999) and Chernenko et al, (2004) find bias. Similarly, Morana (2001) 
finds that forward rates for oil actually point in the wrong direction more often than not. Chinn, 
LeBlancy and Caibion (2005), however, do not find bias in energy futures, while Green and 
Mork (1991) have mixed results for oil. 
Many studies are motivated by the presumed existence of a risk premium in the futures 
price. The evidence is mixed. For example, Bessembinder (1992) found evidence of non-trivial 
risk premia for live cattle, soy beans and cotton, but much smaller risk premia in non-agricultural 
assets such as T-bills. Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) and Gorton, Hayashi and Rouwenhorst 
(2007) find systematic components to commodity returns. On the other hand, Fama and French 
(1987) studied 21 commodities and found only weak evidence of time-varying risk premia. A 
study by Kolb (1992) did not find evidence of risk premia for most of the 29 commodities 
examined. Many of these studies, however, equated the risk premium, to the extra returns earned 
by speculators during particular sample periods, in other words by defining the risk premium as 
observed bias in the futures price as a forecast of the future spot price. These studies tend to 
neglect the question of whether the bias in the futures price might come from systematic 
prediction errors in-sample, rather thanr from a time-varying risk premium.  
                                                           
39 See Yang et al (2001) for a review of the literature.  
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Is the Bias a Risk Premium or Expectation Errors?  
Choe (1990) attempted to bring an independent expectations measure to bear on the question 
of whether the predictive bias in commodity futures is due to a risk premium or to a failure of the 
rational expectations methodology, analogous to the approach taken by Frankel and Froot (1989) 
for the foreign exchange market. To explore commodities (including copper, sugar, coffee, 
cocoa, maize, cotton, wheat and soybeans), Choe obtained the data on futures prices and then 
approximated expectations of the future spot price using the forecast conducted by the World 
Bank International Commodity Market Division (CM). He discovered that: 
•  Using futures prices for short-term price forecasting is more bias-prone than relying on 
specialists’ forecasts; 
•  In contrast to the results found by Frankel and Froot (1989), a major part of futures 
forecast bias comes from risk premia as well as expectational errors. For copper, cocoa, 
cotton, and soybeans, the expectational errors seem to play a principle role, whereas the 
existence of risk premia is important for the other commodities; 
•  The size of the risk premia can be large compared to the expectational errors. However, 
the variance of risk premium is larger than that of the expected price change only for 
coffee and wheat; and 
•  The estimated bias from the risk premium is negative while that from expectational error 
is mixed – negative for half of the commodities examined and positive for the others.  
 
Literature Sources on Futures Bias 
Authors Sources 
Dusak 1973  US Department of Agriculture 
Chicago Board of Trade for corn, soy bean, soy oil, wheat, plywood, 
broilers 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange forlLumber, cattle, hogs, pork bellies 
Commodity Exchange for copper, gold, and silver  
Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange for coffee and cocoa 
New York Cotton Exchange for cotton 
Fama and French 1987 
New York Mercantile Exchange for platinum 
Choe 1990  International Economic Division at the World Bank and DRICOM 
database from Data Resource Inc: copper, sugar, coffee, cocoa, maize, 
cotton, wheat, soybeans 
Tomek 1997  Chicago Board of Trade  
Carter 1999  Commodity Future Trading Commission (CFTC): both cash and future 
prices 
Yang et al 2001  Data Stream International: data on Chicago Board of Trade and 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange  
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Appendix Table 1a Phillips-Perron Tests for Unit Root in Aggregate Time-Series 
 Z(rho)  Z(t) 
(MacKinnon p-value) 
Log Real World GDP  -.81 -3.85** 
(.00) 
World Growth Rate  -20.8** -3.59** 
(.01) 
OECD Output Gap  -19.1* -3.34* 
(.01) 
Log Real World GDP – HP 
Trend 
-31.9** -4.84** 
(.00) 
Real Interest Rate  -10.00 -2.18 
(.21) 
Annual Data. Intercept included. Two lags as controls. * (**) indicates rejection of null hypothesis of unit root at .05 
(.01) significance level. 
 
Appendix Table 1b – Phillips-Perron Tests for Unit Root in Commodity-Specific Series 
 Log  Real 
Price 
Spread Log 
Inventory 
Volatility Risk 
Corn  -5.8/-1.8 -61**/-8.6** -2.6/-1.2 -53**/-6.7** -6.2/-1.8 
Copper  -7.4/-1.8 -40**/-5.5** -8.6/-2.0 -39**/-5.2**  -22**/-3.7** 
Cotton  -4.4/-1.6 -77**/-10** -4.5/-1.5 -24**/-4.1**  -11.7/-2.6 
Live Cattle  -7.0/-2.2 -12.3/-2.7 -7.5/-2.7  -39**/-4.5**  -34**/-5.1** 
Live Hogs  -8.3/-2.1 -34**/-6.2**  -23**/-3.5**  -39**/-4.5  -7/11/2.0 
Oats  -7.7/-2.0 -46**/-6.2** -2.1/-0.8 -30**/-4.2**  -29**/-4.7** 
Petroleum  -2.6/-0.8  -27**/-5.1** -5.0/-3.4* -38**/-4.9**  -7.8/-2.0 
Platinum  -3.2/-0.8  -29**/-4.6** 4.6/3.6 -40**/-3.6**  -13.4*/-2.9* 
Silver  -7.3/-1.9 -35**/-5.4** -3.1/-1.3 -19.7**/-3.3*  -14.7*/-3.3* 
Soybeans  -5.4/-1.7 -56**/-8.1** -4.2/-1.8 -24**/-4.0** -3.9/-1.5 
Wheat  -6.6/-2.0 -49**/-6.5** -5.0/-1.7 -28**/-4.2** -5.3/-1.1 
Z(rho)/Z(t) statistics reported. Annual Data. Intercept included. Two lags as controls. (**) indicates rejection of null 
hypothesis of unit root at .05 (.01) significance level.   46
Appendix Table 1c – Panel Unit Root Tests 
 Im,  Pesaran, 
Shin (p-value) 
Levin, Lin  Dickey, Fuller  Maddala, Wu 
Log Real Price  -1.79 
(.13) 
-.14 
(.28) 
65 13.2 
(.93) 
Risk  -1.73 
(.16) 
-.34* 
(.01) 
307 20.6 
(.55) 
Spread  -2.83** 
(.00) 
-.98* 
(.03) 
136 83.6** 
(.00) 
Log Inventory  -1.05 
(.94) 
-.06 
(.95) 
85 27.4 
(.20) 
Volatility  -3.05** 
(.00) 
-.84 
(.09) 
144 58.4** 
(.00) 
Annual Data. Intercept included. Two lags as controls. * (**) indicates rejection of null hypothesis of unit root at .05 
(.01) significance level. 
 
 
Appendix Table 2a – Johansen Tests for Cointegration in Commodity-Specific Models 
 Basic  1% 
level 
3 Lags  Add 
trend 
Add 
Risk 
Drop 
Spread 
Corn  2 1    2 5 2 
Copper  0 0 1 0 1 1 
Cotton  3 1 0    3 2 
Live Cattle  4 3    5 6 2 
Live Hogs  2 1 4 3 4 2 
Oats  2 1 1 2 2 2 
Petroleum  3  3  4  2 
Platinum  2 1 3 1 3 1 
Silver  1 1 3 2 1 0 
Soybeans  2 2 4 2 2 1 
Wheat  3 2 5 2    2 
Maximal rank from Johansen trace statistic at 5 per cent level unless noted. Annual Data. Intercept included. Two 
lags included unless noted. * (**) indicates rejection of null hypothesis of unit root at .05 (.01) significance level. 
Model of log real commodity price includes six controls (spread, log inventory, volatility, real interest rate, log real 
world GDP) unless noted.   47
Appendix Table 2b – Panel Cointegration Tests: Basic Equation 
 G t  Ga  Pt  Pa 
Basic  -1.31 
(1.00) 
-2.47 
(1.00) 
-4.53 
(.92) 
-2.70 
(.99) 
Only 1 lag  -1.88 
(.85) 
-3.02 
(1.00) 
-4.97 
(.85) 
-3.32 
(.98) 
Add constant  -1.41 
(1.00) 
-3.74 
(1.00) 
-4.28 
(1.00) 
-3.47 
(1.00) 
Add constant, 
trend 
-1.31 
(1.00) 
-3.32 
(1.00) 
-3.97 
(1.00) 
-3.08 
(1.00) 
Add lead  -.46 
(1.00) 
-.57 
(1.00) 
-2.34 
(1.00) 
-.87 
(1.00) 
Basic: two lags. P-values (for null hypothesis of no cointegration) recorded in parentheses. Model of log real 
commodity price includes five controls (spread, log inventory, volatility, real interest rate, log real world GDP). 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table 2c – Panel Cointegration Tests, Including Risk 
 G t  Ga  Pt  Pa 
Basic  -1.66 
(.85) 
-2.70 
(1.00) 
-4.72 
(.69) 
-3.07 
(.92) 
Only 1 lag  -1.87 
(.64) 
-5.36 
(.98) 
-5.14 
(.57) 
-4.54 
(.76) 
Add constant  -1.51 
(1.00) 
-5.31 
(1.00) 
-4.00 
(1.00) 
-3.34 
(1.00) 
Add constant, 
trend 
-1.84 
(1.00) 
-6.88 
(1.00) 
-4.84 
(1.00) 
-4.22 
(1.00) 
Add lead  -1.07 
(1.00) 
-2.33 
(1.00) 
-3.28 
(.95) 
-1.79 
(.98) 
Basic: two lags. P-values (for null hypothesis of no cointegration) recorded in parentheses. Model of log real 
commodity price includes six controls (risk, spread, log inventory, volatility, real interest rate, log real world GDP).   48
 
Appendix Table 3: Cointegration Vector Estimates from Commodity-Specific VECs 
 Real  World 
GDP 
+ 
Volatility 
+ 
Spot-Fut. 
Spread 
- 
Inventories 
- 
Real Int rate 
- 
Corn  -.28 
(.21) 
3.65** 
(1.04) 
-.056** 
(.004) 
-.47* 
(.20) 
.03 
(.03) 
Copper  .99** 
(.27) 
-.37 
(1.54) 
-.076** 
(.007) 
-.40* 
(.16) 
-.04 
(.05) 
Cotton  -.92** 
(.19) 
5.75** 
(.95) 
-.054** 
(.003) 
-.91** 
(.24) 
.01 
(.03) 
Cattle  6.20** 
(1.76) 
-72** 
(10) 
-.095** 
(.023) 
17.2** 
(6.6) 
.08 
(.17) 
Hogs  -.09 
(.27) 
17.1** 
(2.7) 
-.032** 
(.004) 
-4.9** 
(1.2) 
.02 
(.03) 
Oats  -.54 
(.31) 
9.6** 
(2.1) 
-.035** 
(.005) 
.18 
(.21) 
.03 
(.03) 
Oil  -5.0 
(3.6) 
20.2** 
(3.7) 
-.15** 
(.01) 
18. 
(12.) 
-.02 
(.19) 
Platinum  -1.9 
(1.0) 
10.0 
(5.8) 
.081** 
(.010) 
.01 
(.19) 
.15 
(.09) 
Silver  -2.1** 
(.3) 
4.6** 
(.6) 
-.043** 
(.003) 
-.89** 
(.13) 
.01 
(.02) 
Soybeans  1.54 
(.79) 
.64 
(2.15) 
-.135 
(.009) 
-.39 
(.34) 
.07 
(.06) 
Wheat  -.69** 
(.14) 
4.44** 
(.64) 
-.039** 
(.003) 
-.39 
(.20) 
.03 
(.02) 
Annual data. ** (*) ≡ significantly different from zero at .01 (.05) level. Standard errors in parentheses;  
Intercept and linear time trend included, not reported. VEC estimation, commodity by commodity, one lag. 
 
 